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A JUDGE REMEMBERS RICHMOND IN THE
POST-BROWN YEARS
ROBE-RT R. MERHIEG, JR.*
I am pleased to participate in any event that pays tribute to Justice
Powell. Although the Law Review has asked me to discuss my years as a
federal judge charged with implementing the Supreme Court's endorsement
of desegregation, any account of my years on the bench necessarily begins
with Lewis F. Powell, Jr. I am proud to recall that when I was under
consideration for appointment to the federal bench, Lewis Powell, then
president of the American Bar Association, led the contingent of Richmond
lawyers who went to Washington, D.C. to speak on my behalf. I am indeed
fortunate to have enjoyed a long personal and professional relationship with
such a truly great man.
I do not think anyone would have guessed back then that newspapers
in Richmond would ultimately come to describe me as some kind of a
social engineer who was willing to infuse his own personal philosophy into
his school desegregation decisions. I had not been a crusader for civil rights
during my twenty plus years as a practicing attorney. I am embarrassed to
admit that before my nomination to the bench, I had been too busy with
my own life and the demands of a busy trial schedule to focus on the
problems of racial discrimination. My mental justification for my inaction,
if indeed I gave it that much thought, was that I as an individual treated
everyone alike. Somehow I accepted that as justification for what I now
view as an inexcusable disregard of my moral responsibilities, both as a
lawyer and as a man.
My primary efforts were inadequate in that they were directed only to
those perceived injustices in which I was involved as counsel. My concerns
seldom extended beyond that parameter even though as a young lawyer in
Richmond I was faced daily with the realities of race-based discrimination.
For instance, I remember that back when I first became a member of the
bar, all male black lawyers were addressed by their first names and were
never called "mister" as were their white counterparts. This was an archaic
and demeaning practice, so I made it my custom to formally address all
attorneys, and to shake hands with opposing counsel, whether black or
white. That even this small gesture annoyed others says much about Vir-
ginia's entrenched antagonistic view toward racial integration.
I was sworn in as a United States District Judge on August 30, 1967.
Over ten years had passed since the Supreme Court's repudiation of the
"separate but equal" doctrine, yet public schools in Richmond, and indeed
in much of Virginia, remained rigidly segregated. Virginia had led the South
* Robert R. Merhige, Jr. is a Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Virginia.
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in massive resistance to the Supreme Court's edict that school systems
should be integrated with "all deliberate speed." Virginia initially responded
to Brown v. Board of Education' with absolute defiance. Indeed, one state
senator, who was later to serve as Governor, stated after Brown:
Integration, however slight, anywhere in Virginia, would be a cancer
eating at the very lifeblood of our public school system. The Brown
decision is either right or wrong. If we think it is right, we should
accept it without circumvention or evasion. If it is wrong, we should
never accept it at all. Men of conscience and principle do not
compromise with either right or wrong.
Schools were closed rather than integrated. It is reported that Judge Sterling
Hutcheson of the Eastern District of Virginia chose to step down from the
bench rather than to enforce the law.
By 1959, Virginia's strategy of massive resistance faltered as it became
clear that the federal courts would not turn a blind eye to what amounted
to overt state-enforced segregation. Segregationists in Virginia, and through-
out the South, became more creative. Relying on Judge Parker's pro-
nouncement that the Constitution "does not require integration .... [i]t
merely forbids discrimination," ' 2 state and local authorities adopted freedom-
of-choice plans to comply with the letter of the law.
Under these freedom-of-choice plans, each student was assigned to a
particular school, usually the neighborhood school the child had been
attending previously. Because housing patterns were strictly segregated both
by law and by custom, the racial composition of the schools reflected the
lack of racial diversity in the neighborhoods. All students were then allowed
a "free transfer" to the school of the student's choice. In most instances,
this meant that a small percentage of the black students would choose to
attend the previously all white school, while no whites would attend the
black school. "Black schools" and "white schools" thus remained in place.
Many viewed freedom-of-choice plans as a moderate and reasonable
response to the desegregation question. Indeed, prior to my appointment to
the federal bench, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia in Richmond had approved the plans. Ultimately, the constitu-
tionality of the plans was challenged in the Supreme Court. In his arguments
to the high Court, State Senator Frederick T. Gray articulated Virginia's
defense of the freedom-of-choice plan:
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (Parker, J., construing
Supreme Court's ruling in Brown). As J.W. Peltason has noted, many southerners clung to
Judge Parker's dictum that the Brown decision required only desegregation, not integration.
See J.W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN: SouTEnRN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
23 (1971) (discussing Judge Parker's attempt to calm southern fears); Is Freedom of Choice
Illegal?, RICH. NEws LEADER, May 1, 1969, at 6 -(stating that "Judge Merhige may forget
that the United States Supreme Court has never explicitly denied [the Briggs decision]").
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The state may remain neutral with respect to private racial discrim-
ination. Desegregation (i.e the elimination of state enforced segre-
gation solely because of race) is a legal question; integration (the
compulsory assignment of pupils to achieve intermingling) is an
educational question, best left for decision by educators, for edu-
cational purposes, on the basis of educational criteria. A freedom-
of-choice plan alone honors this distinction.
3
The Supreme Court rejected Virginia's freedom-of-choice plan based on
evidence that the plan was ineffective as a tool of desegregation.4 The Court
observed that after nearly three years of operation, the freedom-of-choice
plan utilized by New Kent County had failed to achieve a unitary school
system. Eighty-five percent of the black children remained in the traditionally
all black school, while not a single white child attended the same.5 The
Supreme Court further held that New Kent County's freedom-of-choice
plan impermissibly placed the burden of dismantling the dual school system
on children and parents, rather than on the school boards as Brown had
dictated. 6
The message of Green was inescapable: the Supreme Court was now
interested in results. As one commentator has noted, with Green, the
Supreme Court recognized that "centuries of discrimination could not be
overcome by benign indifference," and thus the Court shifted from the
modest beginning of "thou shalt not segregate" to the position that "thou
shalt integrate."
7
The Supreme Court's decision in Green came down on May 28, 1968,
some nine months after I had been sworn in as a United States District
Court Judge. Upon hearing of the Supreme Court's decision, I naively
thought that the era of resistance to desegregation in Virginia's school
systems, whether through overt or indirect means, was coming to a close.
Adherence to the law was something I took for granted. The "all deliberate
speed" mandate of Brown had invited delay, if not defiance. Reasonable
individuals differed on whether Brown required integration, or merely
prohibited overt state-sanctioned discrimination. Now that the supreme law
of the land affirmatively and unequivocally required school districts to take
direct action to achieve integration, I fully expected prompt, if begrudging,
compliance.
The day after Virginia's freedom-of-choice plan was struck down in
Green, Samuel W. Tucker, who had argued the case for the plaintiffs in
3. Brief for the Respondents at 32, Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
(No. 695).
4. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (rejecting Virginia's freedom-of-
choice plan).
5. Id. at 441.
6. Id. at 441-42.
7. Ronald J. Bacigal & Margaret 1. Bacigal, A Case Study of the Federal Judiciary's
Role in Court-Ordered Busing: The Professional and Personal Experiences of U.S. District
Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., 3 J.L. & PoL. 693, 697 (1986-87).
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the Supreme Court, came to my chambers seeking a hearing date in reference
to the Green case. This effort was followed in rapid succession with motions
to reopen each and every school case that had come through the Richmond
Division. The exact number escapes me, but I am reasonably certain that
between the school cases within the jurisdiction of the Eastern District of
Virginia and those which Judge Dalton of the Western District asked me
to handle, I found myself with more than forty school cases.8 This was a
sufficient number to lead an editorial writer of one of our local papers, so
I am told, to describe me as the "commissar of education."
The Supreme Court pronounced in Green that "[t]he obligation of the
district courts, as it always has been, is to assess the effectiveness of a
proposed plan in achieving desegregation." 9 However, even federal judges
acting out of sincere motivations differed on what the law required. Gov-
ernor Godwin quoted United States District Judge Waiter Hoffman, a judge
well known for his firm upholding of the mandates of the Supreme Court
in reference to Brown and its progeny, as saying that it was "difficult to
understand just what the law was" in regard to the pace of school integra-
tion. 10 When a federal judge in Tulsa ruled that "good faith compliance"
satisfied the law even though de facto racial imbalances resulted, I suppose
that some Virginians began to wonder why they had been cursed with Bob
Merhige. The Richmond News Leader, apparently echoing the frustrations
of many citizens, asked, "why ... can't Judge Merhige interpret the
[flederal law here as U.S. District Judge Daugherty interprets it in Okla-
homa?""
The mandate of the Supreme Court in Green could not, in my view,
have been more emphatic. In its unanimous opinion the Court held that
"The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.'
2
As I reflect on those days, the Green case was about as simple a school
case as could be imagined. New Kent County's utilization of a freedom-of-
choice plan had effectively maintained the patterns of segregation that had
previously been mandated by law. New Kent County had only two schools,
one a white school, and the other an all black school. All one had to do
to desegregate those schools was to make one a grammar school and the
other a high school. Although I never had occasion to draw a school
desegregation plan, and Green was my first association with a school case,
the solution in this case seemed obvious and simple to me.
8. Before coming to the federal bench, Judge Dalton had been a member of the Virginia
state legislature and had made two unsuccessful bids for the governor's seat. Because Judge
Dalton had been outspoken in his denunciation of massive resistance during his political career,
he thought it would be inappropriate for him to preside over the school cases.
9. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
10. Is Freedom of Choice Illegal?, supra note 2, at 6.
I1. Id.
12. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
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New Kent County's initial defense was that to convert the schools would
require extensive renovations. Although the plaintiffs contended that the
schools could be ready for desegregation within a matter of weeks, the
defendants insisted that the anticipated renovations would take considerably
longer. The tactics used by the New Kent School Board were not unlike
those used by the leadership of other localities. Whenever possible, I tried
to proceed slowly to give the community time to adjust.
Unfortunately, my attempts to accommodate the communities only led
to more delay. One school district argued that they needed more time to
convert an all white school into a racially mixed grammar school. The
school board cited such renovations as lowering the urinals so that the
younger students could be accommodated. Because the school board made
the claim with a straight face, I was forced into a fact-finding mission to
determine that the urinals were not, in fact, excessively high. Can you
imagine the scene! Ridiculous scenarios such as these eventually caused me
to depart from my cautious and accommodating approach. Samuel W.
Tucker was correct when he counseled me that "you don't help the dog by
cutting off a little of his tail at a time."
As to the political context of desegregation, I was constantly reminded
that President Nixon was opposed to what became the favored political
subject-busing-despite the fact that busing did not begin with school
desegregation. In the counties where there were great distances between
schools, busing children to school was simply a fact of life. Busing thus
had been employed in Virginia for many years prior to the Supreme Court's
action, although it was generally utilized only for the benefit of white
students. Samuel Tucker reported that when he attended grammar school,
only white children were afforded the use of buses. Black children were, if
they wished to attend, forced to walk to school. Mr. Tucker often referred
to the fact that he had "bootlegged" a high school education by using a
Washington, D.C. address in order to attend high school, for in his home
county the education of black children did not include high school.
Busing, though necessary, became a reason for disagreeing with inte-
gration plans. Indeed, in some instances, the practical argument against
busing could be easily made. Time spent riding to and from school was,
and is, largely unproductive. Nevertheless, because of the physical locations
of schools, it was necessary.
In cities such as Richmond, generally the schools for whites were in
much better condition than the schools in black neighborhoods. The bottom
line was that the children were paying for the conduct of prior generations
who had maintained, by custom and law, segregated neighborhoods. The
policies of the federal government in restructuring housing loans to what
the bureaucrats referred to as "homogeneous neighborhoods" were also to
blame.
Those forty school cases were heard in turn, and the court repeatedly
ordered the various school boards to abandon freedom-of-choice plans in
favor of plans which would effectively desegregate their schools. The re-
sponse of the community was both rapid and harsh. I was told at the time
1992]
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that the local newspapers were continuously critical of the court's action
and expressed their criticism almost daily in both their editorials and the
printing of letters from the public. The opposition was continuous. Letters
literally poured into my office, and the threats were of a serious enough
nature to cause the marshal's service to assign between eight and eleven
marshals to guard duty at my home twenty-four hours a day, to accompany
my youngest son to school, and to escort my wife whenever she left the
property. For almost two years I never left my home without the company
of one or more United States Marshals. The United States Attorney's office
reported that on at least two occasions one or more persons endeavored to
solicit money for use in hiring someone to assassinate me.
It was indeed an unpleasant time for me and my family. The Ku Klux
Klan paraded around my home every Sunday for months. Another hostile
group would from time to time organize what they referred to in signs as
"Merhige's funeral dirge." On these days a hearse, with a long row of cars
behind, would circle the courthouse, sometimes for hours at a time. In the
interim, my dog was shot, my guest house was burned to the ground, and
calls for my impeachment emanated not only from what might be described
as "ordinary citizens," but from state legislators, at least one United States
Senator, and one congressman. Indeed, one of my claims to fame is that
at one point my name was substituted for that of Chief Justice Earl Warren
on a billboard which formerly read "Impeach Warren."
All was not as grim as perhaps these statements indicate, for I got some
perverse pleasure out of composing a form letter to respond to the hundreds
of letters which I received, most of which condemned me as being un-
American and unworthy, both as a judge and as a man. Frankly, I did not
read those letters, although my secretary kept me abreast of their tenor.
All letters threatening any member of my family were sent to the United
States Attorney. In any event, my response to the letters went something
like this:
Dear Sir or Madam:
The Judge does not read correspondence involving cases pending
before the court. He did ask that I, a member of his staff, respond
by thanking you for your kind wishes. Those wishes and your
prayers are deeply appreciated by both him and his family.
Very truly yours,
(signed) A Staff Member
Once a group of men came to the courthouse announcing that they
were members of the Ku Klux Klan and intended to make a citizens arrest
of me for allegedly "violating the Constitution." Upon their unsuccessful
attempt, they announced to the television cameras that while they could not
get to me in the courthouse, they would make their citizens arrest at another
time and another place, perhaps in church.
Although the Klan never made good on its threat to arrest me, many
of my friends and family were, for a time, understandably disturbed by the
possibility that I might be abducted by the KKK. Shortly after the threat,
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I was relaxing on a Sunday mornirig, cleaning my swimming pool while a
friend of mine paddled around the pool in a floating chair. We were
chatting, and my friend asked where the marshals were. I assured him that
they were around somewhere, probably patrolling the property. Not satis-
fied, my friend demanded to know what action I would take if the KKK
came to arrest me right then and there. I said, "I'd look at you and I'd
say, Judge, if I were you I'd get the hell out of that pool." Within seconds,
my friend paddled to the side and ran toward the house, and I was soon
surrounded by marshals inquiring as to what the difficulty was.
I foolishly believed, especially as my decrees were appealed and affirmed
by my appellate court and certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court,
that the public, although perhaps reluctant, would accept the law as the
law. Certainly, in my opinion, those who threatened not only me but the
welfare of my family, and those who picketed the court house by the
hundreds, were totally irresponsible and totally unappreciative of the fact
that ours is a country of law. I was shocked at the response. One could
understand resentment toward a judge if, for example, he were entering
decrees which affected so many people and those decrees' were continually
reversed by appellate courts, but such was not the situation. Out of some
forty-two desegregation cases I decided, only two did not stand on appeal. 3
I recognized that many citizens did not like the court's decrees, but I lived
in hope that the intelligent people would ultimately understand that the law
was the law, and I must say that hope ultimately came to pass, although
it was some years in coming.
It would be unfair to leave the impression that every citizen acted
irresponsibly. Many were courageous. Governor Holton, in particular, who
had school-age children, publicly escorted them to public schools in accord
with the desegregation decree. The Governor's actions were even more
remarkable given that because the Governor's mansion was located on state,
not city property, the Governor's children were technically exempt from the
court's busing order. His actions brought criticism from a segment of the
public, but his courage was a great source of comfort to me. Indeed, his
actions helped to alleviate my concern that I had unfairly subjected my
own family to danger.
Among others who exhibited courageousness in their vocal support of
quiet adherence to the law was my friend, J. Sargeant Reynolds, a state
senator and then Lieutenant Governor. There were, I am sure, many others,
13. Dale Eisman, Judge Merhige Makes His (Bench) Mark, RICH. Tws-DIsPATCH, Aug.
28, 1977, at GI. One of the cases that did not stand on appeal was the Emporia case which
was reversed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which in turn was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court. See Wright v. County Sch. Bd., 309 F. Supp 671 (E.D. Va.
1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). The other case was
the Richmond consolidation case, which also was reversed by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th
Cir. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973). As a former member of
the Richmond School Board, Justice Powell declined to participate in the case.
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though many local political leaders by their silence left little doubt as to
their feelings of discontent. Of course, I will never forget the tenacious
courage of Samuel Tucker, law partner of Oliver W. Hill, who acted as
counsel for the plaintiffs in many of the cases. Neither will I forget the
many defense lawyers, such as Fred Gray, Boiling Hobbs, and my late
colleague D. Dortch Warriner, who, though disagreeing with the court's
decrees, refused to participate in encouraging the personal attacks upon me
and my family.
It has been a long time since the first order in accord with Green was
entered and even longer since Brown, and we are, in my view, still searching
for a truly integrated system of education. Nevertheless, we have made
progress, though hopefully not as much as we will in the same period of
time in the future.
African-Americans are at long last receiving, to a great extent, the
treatment envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment. Our citizenry is at
long last conscious of the educational deprivation to which some of our
citizens have been subjected, and time, morality, and the law give great
promise of ultimate equality in education as well as in other aspects of our
lives.
